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The current international financial crisis is part of a perennial pattern. Today’s events 
have echoes in earlier big international financial crises which were triggered by events in 
the U.S. financial system. Examples include the crises of 1857,1893, 1907 and 1929-
1933. This crisis has many similarities to those of the past but also some important 
modern twists. 
The crisis started in the U.S.. with the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in early 
2007 and the end of a major housing boom. It occurred following two years of rising 
policy interest rates. Its causes include major changes in regulation, lax oversight, 
relaxation of normal standards of prudent lending and a prolonged period of abnormally 
low interest rates. Defaults on mortgages spread to investment banks and commercial 
banks in the U.S. and across the world via an elaborate network of derivatives. It has 
recently spilled over into the real economy through a virulent credit crunch and 
collapsing equities market which will likely produce a significant recession. The Fed and 
other central banks have responded in a classical way by flooding the financial markets 
with liquidity and the fiscal authorities are also dealing with the decline in solvency in the 
banking system following the template of earlier bailouts like the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation in the 1930s, Sweden in 1992 and Japan in the late 1990s. 
This paper provides an historical perspective on the current crisis, contrasts the old with 
the modern and offers some lessons for policy. Section 1 describes the crisis in a bit more 
detail. Section 2 provides some descriptive empirical evidence putting the crisis in long-  3
run perspective. Section 3 presents some modern parallels and modern twists of the crisis. 
Section 4 discusses some of the issues in historical perspective for the emerging market 
economies. Finally, section 5 concludes with a discussion of some of the historical lessons 
for  policy.
 
  1. The  Crisis 
 
The crisis occurred following two years of rising policy interest rates. Its causes include : 
major changes in regulation, lax regulatory oversight, a relaxation of normal standards of 
prudent lending and a period of abnormally low interest rates . The default on a 
significant fraction of subprime mortgages produced spillover effects around the world 
via the securitized mortgage derivatives into which these mortgages were bundled, to the 
balance sheets of investment banks, hedge funds and conduits( which are bank-owned but 
off their balance sheets) which intermediate between mortgage and other asset backed 
commercial paper and long-term securities. The uncertainty about the value of the 
securities collateralized by these mortgages spread uncertainty about the soundness of 
loans for leveraged buyouts. All of this led to the freezing of the interbank lending market 
in August 2007 and substantial liquidity injections subsequently  by the Federal Reserve 
and other central banks. 
Since then the Fed both extended and expanded its discount window facilities and cut the
funds rate by 300 basis points. The crisis worsened in March 2008 with the rescue of the
Investment bank, Bear Stearns, by JP Morgan backstopped by funds from the Federal   4
Reserve. The rescue was justified  on the grounds that Bear Stearns exposure to 
counterparties was so extensive that a worse crisis would follow if it were not bailed out. 
The March crisis also led to the creation of a number of new discount window facilities 
whereby investment banks could access the window and which broadened the collateral 
acceptable for discounting. The next major event was a Federal Reserve Treasury bailout 
and partial nationalization of the insolvent GSEs, Fannie and Freddie Mac in July on the 
grounds that they were crucial to the functioning of the mortgage market. 
Events took a turn for the worse in September when the Treasury and Fed allowed the 
investment bank Lehman Brothers to fail  to discourage the belief that all insolvent 
institutions would be saved in an attempt to prevent moral hazard . It was argued that 
Lehman was both in worse shape and less exposed to counterparty risk than Bear Stearns. 
The next day the authorities bailed out and nationalized the insurance giant AIG fearing 
the systemic consequences for collateralized -default swaps  ( insurance contracts on 
securities) if it were allowed to fail. The fallout from the Lehman bankruptcy then turned 
the liquidity crisis into a full fledged global credit crunch and stock market crash (as well 
described in Kindleberger’s Manias, Panics and Crashes) as interbank lending effectively 
seized up on the fear that no banks were safe. 
 In the ensuing atmosphere of panic, along with Fed liquidity assistance to the 
commercial paper market and the extension of the safety net to money market mutual 
funds, the US Treasury sponsored its Troubled Asset Relief Plan ( TARP) whereby $700 
billion could be devoted to the purchase of heavily discounted mortgage backed and other
securities to remove them from the banks’ balance sheets and restore bank lending. The  5
bill was initially rejected by the Congress but then after the Senate added on to it many 
politically popular and expensive items was finally passed a week later in the midst of 
continued financial turmoil. 
In early  October the crisis spread to Europe and to the emerging countries  as the global 
interbank market ceased functioning . The UK authorities responded by pumping equity 
into British banks, guaranteeing all interbank deposits and providing massive liquidity. 
The EU countries responded in kind. And on October 13 the US Treasury followed suit 
with a plan to inject $250 billion into the US  banks,to provide insurance of senior 
interbank debt and unlimited deposit insurance coverage for non interest bearing deposits. 
Time will tell whether these plans, which are similar to earlier, mainly successful, rescue 
packages like the RFC in the US in the 1930s and  the Swedish and Japanese rescues in 
the 1990s, may solve the solvency crisis. 
 
    2. Some Descriptive Historical Evidence 
 
Today’s turmoil must be viewed in historical perspective. Figure 1 provides some 
background evidence for the U.S. over the past century. The upper panel from 1953 to 
September 2008 , shows the monthly  spreads between the Baa corporate bond rate and 
the ten-year Treasury constant maturity bond rate. The spread, inter alia, represents a 
measure of the financial market’s assessment of credit risk and also a measure of 
financial  instability reflecting asymmetric information ( Mishkin 1991). Figure 2 takes a 
longer view and shows the Baa corporate bond rate and the Ten year Treasury Composite  6
bond rate from 1921 to September 2008. Also displayed in both figures are National 
Bureau of Economic Research ( NBER) recession dates and major financial market 
events including stock market crashes, financial crises, and some major political events 
that affected financial markets. The lower panels of Figures 1 and 2 show policy interest 
rates –the federal funds rate since 1953 and the discount rate for the longer 20
th century. 
As can be seen , the peaks in the credit cycle ( proxied by the spreads) are often lined up 
with the upper turning points in the NBER reference cycles. Also many of the events, 
especially the stock market crashes and the banking crises of the 1930s, occur close to the 
peaks. Moreover , the lower panel often shows the policy rate peaking very close to or 
before the peaks of the credit cycle. Its movements roughly reflect the tightening of 
policy before the bust and loosening in reaction to the oncoming recession afterwards. As 
can be seen in the recent crisis, by September 2008 the Baa ten year TCM spread reached 
levels comparable to that reached in the last recession 2001-2002 and above that of the 
credit crunch of 1990-91. The Baa Ten year Composite spread was just below the spreads 
in the early 1980s recession after the Volcker shock and President Carter’s credit restraint 
program. All of these events were associated with significant recessions. 
 
  3. Historical Parallels and Modern Twists 
 
Many of the financial institutions and instruments caught up in the crisis are part of the 
centuries old phenomenon of financial innovation. The new instruments often  devised  to   7
avoid regulation, are then proved to be successful or not by the test of financial stress 
such as we have been recently encountering. 
The rise and fall of financial institutions and instruments occurs as part of a long standing 
pattern of booms and busts in the markets for equities, land , commodities, foreign 
exchange and other assets. The cycle is financed by credit. Lending booms and busts and 
the credit cycle are also intimately connected to the business cycle. 
A well known tradition in monetary economics which goes back to the nineteenth century 
and in the twentieth century was fostered by Wesley Mitchell ( 1913), Irving Fisher 
( 1933), Hyman Minsky( 1977) ,Charles Kindleberger and others. It tells the tale of a 
business cycle upswing driven by what Fisher called a displacement ( an exogenous event 
that provides new profitable opportunities for investment) leading to an investment boom 
financed by bank money( and accommodative monetary policy) and by new credit 
instruments –financial innovation. The boom leads to a state of euphoria where investors 
have difficulty distinguishing sound from unsound prospects and where fraud can be 
rampant. It can also lead to a bubble characterized by asset prices rising independently 
from their fundamentals. The boom inevitably leads to a state of overindebtedness, when 
agents have insufficient cash flow to service their liabilities. In such a situation a crisis 
can be triggered by errors in judgement by debtors and creditors in an environment 
changing from monetary ease to monetary tightening. The crisis can lead to fire sales of 
assets, declining net worths, bankruptcies, bank failures and an ensuing recession. 
A key dynamic in the crisis stressed by Mishkin(1997) is information asymmetry, 
manifest in the spread between risky and safe securities, the consequences of   8
which(adverse selection and moral hazard) are ignored in the boom and come into play 
with a vengeance in the bust. 
Banks played a key role in the traditional story because bank credit in large part financed 
the boom, and the bust was often accompanied by bank failures and banking panics—
events which eventually made the downturn worse. This led to the traditional case for the 
monetary authority to act as a lender of last resort and provide liquidity at penalty rates to 
the money market and or discount window lending to solvent but liquid banks. 
Countercyclical monetary policy is also an integral part of the boom-bust credit cycle. 
Bordo and Wheelock( 2007a, 2007b) using data for the US and 9 other countries for the 
past century show that stock market booms occur in environments of low inflation, rising 
real GDP growth and low policy real interest rates. As the boom progresses and 
inflationary pressure builds up, central banks( before World War II,  driven by the gold 
convertibility constraint) inevitably tighten their policy rates helping to trigger the 
ensuing crash. The story is similar for housing booms and busts but they follow a 
different cycle because of long gestation lags in construction and in the adjustment 
of prices to a collapse in demand ( Leamer 2007). 
Stock market crashes can be serious events leading to a decline in wealth and in 
consumption and also a scramble for liquidity in turn contributing to incipient banking 
crises. Housing busts also have serious consequences for the banking system via defaults 
on mortgages, and on the real economy via declining wealth on consumption expenditure, 
the collapse of residential investment and a financial accelerator effect as net worths 
decline. The recent housing boom in the US was largely triggered by a long period of 
abnormally low interest rates, attributed to loose monetary policy from 2001 to 2004 in   9
reaction to earlier financial turbulence and then fear of deflation and to a global savings 
glut ( Bernanke 2007). The bust was likely induced by a rise in rates in reaction to the 
inevitable inflationary pressure. 
 
The Non Bank Financial Sector, Financial Innovation and Financial Crises 
 
The traditional financial crisis story depicts a shock to a major financial or non financial 
firm leading to a banking panic as depositors attempt to convert their deposits into 
currency. More recently, especially since the advent of deposit insurance, the source of 
the pressure has come from the asset side, rather than the liability side of a bank’s 
balance sheet. Examples include the Penn Central episode in 1970 when the collapse of 
the railroad led to a panic in the commercial paper market which led, like today to 
concern by the Fed that it would spill over into the banking system. This led the New 
York Fed to open the discount window to the money center banks to freely discount non 
financial firms based on the collateral of sound commercial paper; the Latin American 
debt default of 1982 when many money center banks became close to insolvent until a 
massive rescue was orchestrated between the Fed and the IMF; and the collapse of the 
hedge fund LTCM in 1998 which also was perceived to be a threat to the banking system. 
LTCM was rescued by a lifeboat operation by the New York banks orchestrated by the 
New York Fed .An historical precedent was a crisis in the market for bills of exchange 
that spread from Amsterdam to Hamburg and which like LTCM led to the failure of the 
principal player and many others ( Schnabel and Shinn 2001).In each case the crisis   10
broke in the non bank financial sector but spilled over or threatened to spill over onto the 
banks who were the ultimate creditors. 
Many of the financial crises of the past involved financial innovation which increased 
leverage. The 1763 crisis was centered on the market for bills of exchange, Penn Central 
on the newly revived ( in the 1960s) commercial paper market, the savings and loan crisis 




Although there are many  historical parallels to the current crisis there are several unique 
differences. In the most recent episode, the financial innovation derived from the 
securitization of subprime mortgages and other loans has shifted risk away from the 
originating banks into mortgage and other asset backed securities which bundle the risk 
of less stellar borrowers with more credit worthy ones and which were certified by the 
credit rating agencies as prime. These were absorbed by hedge funds in the US and 
abroad and in the asset backed commercial paper of the commercial and investment 
banks. As Rajan ( 2005) presciently argued, shifting the risk away from banks who used 
to have the incentives to monitor their borrowers to hedge funds and other institutions 
which do not, rather than reducing overall systemic risk increased it by raising the risk of 
a much more widespread meltdown in the event of a tail event as we have recently 
witnessed.  
 A key modern twist was the growth of the non bank financial sector ( shadow banking 
system)  which was not regulated by the central bank nor covered by the financial safety   11
net. According to Eichengreen (2008) its rapid growth was a consequence of the repeal in 
1999 of the Depression era Glass Steagall Act which separated commercial from 
Investment banking. These institutions held much lower capital ratios than the traditional 
commercial banks and hence were considerably more prone to risk. When the crisis hit 
they were forced to engage in major deleveraging involving the fire sale of assets into a 
falling market which in turn lowered the value of their assets and those of other financial 
firms. A similar negative feedback loop occurred during the Great Depression ( Friedman 
and Schwartz 1963). 
 
 
    4. Prospects for the Emerging Markets 
 
Financial crises have always had an international dimension as 
Morgenstern( 1959),Kindleberger( 1978) and Bordo( 1986) have shown. Contagion 
spreads quickly through asset markets, through international banking and through the 
monetary standard. Stock market crashes and banking panics often have occurred in 
many countries within a few months of the original shock. A classic example is the 
Baring crisis of 1890 which started in Argentina and affected the rest of Latin America 
and other emerging countries of the time. It was triggered by central bank tightening in 
England, France and Germany. This led to a series of sudden stops and current account 
reversals ( Bordo 2006) in the emerging countries and a number of banking crises and 
debt defaults. These events were  echoed in the late 1990s ( see Calvo and Talvi 2005).   12
The current crisis was initially contained to the advanced countries among which 
contagion was spread by the holding of opaque subprime mortgage derivatives in diverse 
banks in Europe and elsewhere, and by the seizing up of the asset ( mortgage ) backed 
commercial paper market. In recent weeks pressure has spilled over to the emerging 
markets , especially those who are highly indebted to the advanced countries ,with high 
current account deficits and with significant exposure to the advanced countries boom 
such as Iceland, Hungary and Ukraine( IMF WEO chapter 1 September 2008). IMF and 
ECB rescues have been initiated. However many of the Asian countries (and some  Latin 
American countries) have so far avoided the crisis, likely because of the precautionary 
measures many have taken in reaction to their meltdowns in the Asian crisis of 1997( eg 
the build up of large foreign exchange reserves and reduced exposure to foreign 
borrowing.). As the credit crunch continues and the burgeoning recession in the US and 
Europe plays out, then the emergers that are exposed to foreign capital will be affected  
as well as countries relying for their growth on exports to the US and Europe. 
 
 
   5.  Policy  Lessons  from  History 
 
The crisis has implications for monetary policy on the key issues of liquidity, solvency 
and the stability of the real economy. With respect to liquidity the central banks reacted 
quickly in the Bagehot manner to deal with the freezing of the interbank markets in 
August 2007. The ECB flooded the European money market with liquidity as did the Fed 
which lowered the discount rate by 50 basis points . This suggests they heeded the first   13
part of Bagehot’s lesson to lend freely but not quite on the second part of lending at a 
penalty rate. The Bank of England until mid 2007 followed a strict interpretation of 
Bagehot by keeping its discount window open to all comers but at a penalty rate. The 
subsequent run on Northern Rock on September 14 led to a large infusion of central bank 
liquidity and the announcement of a temporary complete guarantee of all UK bank 
deposits. The run on Northern Rock very likely reflected not the failure of the Bank’s 
lender of last resort policy but inadequacies in the UK’s provision of deposit insurance, 
the ill thought out separation of financial supervision and regulation from the central 
bank and political pressure(  Milne and Wood 2008). 
Since then the pressure on the interbank market and liquidity in general increased during 
the winter of 07-08 and in March with the Bear Stearns crisis , the Fed developed a series 
of new programs for access to the discount window lending including the term auction 
facility(TAF), The Term security Lending Facility( TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility( PDCP).Since March the Fed has also expanded its liquidity provision to the 
commercial paper market.  
These facilities reflected a change in Fed tactics. The change involved provision of credit 
directly to financial firms that the Fed deemed most in need of liquidity in contrast to 
delivering liquidity directly to the market by open market purchases of Treasury 
securities and leaving the distribution of liquidity to individual firms to the market. The 
choice of targeted lending instead of imperial liquidity provision by the market exposed 
the Fed to the temptation to politicize its selection of recipients of its credit. In addition 
one question that  arose  is why this complicated method of providing liquidity was 
introduced when the uncomplicated system of open market operations is available? A   14
second question is why did the Fed  reduce its holdings of government securities. How 
would the Fed be able to tighten monetary policy when it finally decides to combat a rise 
in the inflation rate? The only way to tighten is to sell government securities. The 
mortgage backed securities on the Fed’s balance sheet may not be easily marketable.  
With respect to solvency, the Fed and the other US monetary authorities have engaged in 
a series of bailouts of incipient insolvent firms deemed too systemically connected to fail. 
These include Bear Stearns in March 2008, the GSEs in July and AIG in September. The 
investment bank Lehman Brothers had been allowed to fail in September on the grounds 
that it was basically insolvent and not as systemically important as the others. One 
wonders if Bear Stearns had been allowed to fail if the severe crisis in September/October 
2008 could have been avoided. Had Bear Stearns simply been closed and liquidated it is 
unlikely that more demand for Fed credit would have come forward than that actually 
occurred. The fact that general creditors and derivative counterparties of Bear Stearns 
were fully protected by the merger of the firm with JP Morgan Chase had greater 
spillover effects on the financial services industry than would have been the case had the 
Fed appointed a receiver and frozen old accounts and payments as of the date of the 
appointment. Fewer public funds would have been subjected to risk. When Drexel 
Burnham Lambert was shut down in 1990, there were no spillover effects. 
Furthermore assume, as the Fed argued at the time, that there would have been a crisis in 
March like the one that followed Lehman’s failure in September. Would it have been as 
bad as the latter event? Assume that the moral hazard implications of bailing out Bear 
Stearns led the remaining investment banks and other market players to follow riskier 
strategies than otherwise on the assumption that they also would be bailed out. This   15
surely made the financial system more fragile than otherwise. So that when the monetary 
authorities decided to let Lehman fail the shock that ensued and the damage to confidence 
was much worse. 
Since the September 2008 crisis it has finally been realized that the deepest problem 
facing the financial system is solvency. The problem stems from the difficulty of pricing 
securities backed by a pool of assets, whether mortgage loans, student loans, commercial 
paper issues, or credit card receivables. Pricing securities based on a pool of assets is 
difficult because the quality of individual components of the pool varies and unless each 
component is individually examined and evaluated, no accurate price of the security can 
be determined. 
As a result, the credit market, confronted by financial firms whose portfolios are filled 
with securities of uncertain value, derivatives that are so complex the art of pricing them 
has not been mastered, is plagued by the inability to determine which firms are solvent 
and which are not. Lenders are unwilling to extend loans when they cannot be sure that a 
borrower is creditworthy. This is a serious shortcoming of the securitization process that 
is responsible for the paralysis of the credit market. 
The Fed was slow to recognize the solvency problem. It emphasized providing liquidity 
to the market when that is not the answer to the problem of the market’s uncertainty 
about the solvency of individual or sectoral  financial firms. No financial market can 
function normally when basic information about the solvency of market participants is 
lacking. The securities that are the product of securitization are the root of the turmoil in 
financial markets that began long before the housing market burst.   16
The Treasury’s plan of October 13, 2008 , based on the UK plan to inject capital into the 
banking system was designed to help solve this problem. However an issue that was not 
clear is whether funds would be injected into insolvent banks or into solvent banks which 
are temporarily short of capital. If funds were to go to insolvent banks this could prolong 
the credit crunch.  
There is ample historical precedent for the Treasury plan including the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation established by the Hoover administration in 1932. Under Roosevelt 
it injected $ 1.3 billion to 6000 banks which is equivalent to $ 200 billion in equity today 
( Sylla 2008). In 1932 the Reconstruction Finance Corporation ( RFC)’s efforts were 
hampered by the publication of the list of banks raising capital. This led to runs on these 
banks and unwillingness by others to participate. It also has precedent in the Swedish 
bank bailout of 1992 and in Japan’s long delayed bailout in the late 1990s. 
With respect to the real economy, the Fed with its dual mandate of price stability and 
high growth ( full employment) focused on growth and cut the Funds rate  vigorously. 
Considerable empirical and historical evidence suggests that credit crunches exacerbate 
recessions ( see figures 1 and 2 and IMF WEO chapter 4 September 2008). Given the 
Fed’s dual mandate, the risk of recession consequent upon the credit crunch seemed to 
have  been a reasonable rationale for a temporary easing of monetary policy. This action 
leaves open the possibility that the Fed could return to its emphasis on price stability once 
the recovery is in sight. 
Another lesson concerns whether the Fed should continue to follow the reactive policy to 
asset booms that it has been following or follow a preemptive policy. The traditional 
view of monetary policy argues that central banks should act reactively and deal with the   17
consequences for the financial system of an asset price boom after it has burst (Bernanke 
and Gertler 2001). An alternative view argues that if an asset bubble ( eg housing) is on 
the horizon, then the Fed should act pre-emptively to defuse it ( Cecchetti et al 2000). 
Bordo and Jeanne ( 2002) consider a circumstance in which the use of preemptive policy 
against the occurrence of a low probability event, which can have catastrophic 
consequences, such as a national housing bust, can be welfare improving. The recent 
events may spark further debate. 
An additional lesson speculates on the genesis of the crisis. The recent financial crisis 
likely could have been avoided if the Fed had not provided as much liquidity as it did 
from 2001 to 2004. After Y2K when no financial crisis occurred , it promptly withdrew 
the massive infusion of liquidity it had provided. By contrast thereafter, it foresaw a 
series of shocks to the economy that might lead to financial crisis , eg the tech bust of 
2001 and 9/11. In each case it injected liquidity, but when no financial crisis occurred , it 
permitted the additional funds it had provided to remain in the money market. In addition 
it overreacted to the threat of deflation in 2003-2004 which may have been of the 
good( productivity driven)variety rather than of the bad ( recessionary) variety ( Bordo 
and Filardo 2005). If consequent upon these events the market had not been infused with 
liquidity as much as they were and for so long, then interest rates would not have been as 
low  in recent years as they were and the housing boom which had just bust may not have 
expanded as much as it did . Evidence for this perspective  by Taylor ( 2007) suggests 
that  interest rates in this period were on average considerably lower than would be the 
case based on his famous rule.  
    Some Less Gloomy Lessons from the Crisis   18
Finally, there are some less gloomy lessons from the crisis. First is the compressed 
consolidation of the U.S. banking  industry. Since the 1990s the U.S. banking system has 
been slowly consolidating to take advantage of the removal of barriers to interstate 
banking and branch banking. Canada and most European countries went through this 
consolidation by mergers and acquisition in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Evidence suggests that the U.S. banking system historically was both less 
stable and less efficient than its Canadian counterpart( Bordo, Redish and Rockoff 1996). 
The recent crisis by forcing mergers and exit facilitates the move to a banking system 
with features closer to those of the other advanced countries with a few very large banks. 
However because of its legacy of community banking with significant local social capital  
many smaller banks will likely survive. 
Second, the crisis is resolving issues raised by the Glass Steagall act of 1933 which 
separated commercial from investment banking. The act was repealed in 1999 and since 
then the more lightly regulated investment banks with an advantage of lower capital 
requirements competed successfully with the commercial banks , in turn inducing them to 
increase leverage and move liabilities off their balance sheets. The resultant increase in 
risk contributed to the crisis. The demise of Bear Stearns and Lehman has forced the 
other investment banks to merge with major commercial banks, to come under the 
umbrella of the Fed and FDIC safety nets. The creation of such universal banks has 
returned the US to the system it had before Glass Steagall and moves it closer to that of 
the banks in some European countries. Such universal banks have had a long history of 
stability and efficiency ( Fohlin 2007).   19
Third the extension of the lender of last resort function to include most types of collateral 
and most financial institutions seems to be following some strictures from Bagehot’s 
Lombard Street(1873) on what the central bank should do in a panic. Bagehot quotes 
what a Bank of England director said about its actions in the crisis of 1825: 
“” we lent it by every possible means and in modes we never adopted before; we took in 
stock on security, we purchased Exchequer bills, we not only discounted outright, but we 
made advances on the deposits of bills of exchange to an immense amount, in short by 
every means consistent with the safety of the Bank, and we were not on some occasions 
over-nice. Seeing the dreadful state in which the public were, we rendered every 
assistance in our power” ( page 52). 
Fourth and finally is the speed of response by the monetary authorities in the US and 
Europe in resolving both the liquidity and solvency aspects of the crisis. This is in 
contrast to the Great Depression when the Fed did virtually nothing and it was up to FDR 
by devaluing the dollar in 1933 and   the Treasury through its gold purchases thereafter,  
to jump start the economy . It is also in contrast to the slow response by the Japanese 





Walter Bagehot ( 1873).  Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market. London. 
H.S. King 
 
Ben Bernanke ( 2007). “ Global Imbalances: Recent Developments and Prospects.” 
Bundesbank Lecture. Berlin. Germany 
 
Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler ( 2001) “ Should Central Banks Respond to Movements 
in Asset Prices? American Economic Review 91(2). 253-257. 
   20
Michael D. Bordo ( 1986). ‘ Financial Crises, Banking Crises, Stock Market Crashes and 
the Money supply: Some International Evidence, “ in Financial Crises and the World 
Banking System. eds Forrest Capie and Geoffrey Wood. London. MacMillan 
 
Michael Bordo, Angela Redish and Hugh Rockoff ( 1996) “ The U.S. Banking System 
from a Northern Exposure: Stability versus Efficiency” Journal of Economic History Vol 
54. No. 2 pp 325-341 June 
 
Michael D. Bordo and Olivier Jeanne ( 2002) ‘ Boom- Busts in Asset Prices, Economic 
Instability, and Monetary Policy.” NBER WP 8966. 
 
Michael D. Bordo and Andrew Filardo ( 2005). “ Deflation and Monetary Policy in a 
Historical Perspective: Remembering the Past or Being Condemned to Repeat it. 
“ Economic Policy  October. 
 
Michael D. Bordo (2006) “ Sudden Stops, Financial Crises and Original Sin in Emerging 
Countries: Déjà vu?” NBER WP 12393 July. 
 
Michael D. Bordo and David Wheelock ( 2007a), “ Stock Market Booms and Monetary 
Policy in the Twentieth Century” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review . March/ 
April Vol 89. No.2 
 
Michael D. Bordo and David Wheelock ( 2007b), When Do Stock Market Booms Occur: 
The Macroeconomic and Policy Environments of 20
th Century Booms” in Jeremy Atack 
( ed). The Origins and Development of Financial Markets and Institutions. Cambrideg, 
Cambridge University Press( in press ) 
 
Guillermo Calvo and  Ernesto Talvi (2005) “ Sudden Stops , Financial Factors and 
Economic Collapses in Latin America; Lessons from Argentina and Chile” NBER WP 
11153 
 
Stephen B. Cecchetti( 2006). Asset Prices and Central Bank Policy. Geneva Reports on 
the World Economy. No.2. 
 
Barry Eichengreen ( 2008) “ Origins and Responses to the Crisis” UC Berkeley October 
( mimeo) 
 
Irving Fisher ( 1933) ‘ The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions “ Econometrica 
Vol 1; 337-57. 
 
Caroline Fohlin ( 2007)  Finance Capitalism and Germany’s Rise to Industrial Power. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
 
 International Monetary Fund. ( 2008) World Economic Outlook. Washington DC.  
October 
   21
Edward E. Leamer ( 2007) “ “ Housing and the Business Cycle “ Federal Reserve Bank 
of Kansas City. Jackson Hole Symposium September 2007. 
 
Alistair Milne and Geoffrey E. Wood ( 2008) “ Banking Crises: Solutions Old and New” 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review Vol 90. No. 5  Sept/Oct . 
 
 Hyman Minsky ( 1977) “ A Theory of Systemic Fragility. “ in E.J. Altman and A. W. 
Sametz ( eds). Financial Crises: Institutions and Markets in a Fragile Environment. New 
York. Wiley, 138-52 
 
Frederic Mishkin ( 1991) “ Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises; A Historical 
Perspective.” NBER WP 3400. 
 
Frederic Mishkin ( 1997) “ The Causes and Propagation of Financial Instability : Lessons 
for Policy Makers’ in Maintaining Financial Stability in a Global Economy. Federal 
Reserve Bank of  Kansas City . Jackson Hole Symposium. 55-96 
 
 Wesley C. Mitchell ( 1913) Business Cycles. New York. 
 
Oskar Morgenstern ( 1959) International Financial Transactions and the Business Cycle. 
New York, NBER 
 
Raghuram Rajan (2005). “Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier ?” 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole Symposium . September 
 
 
 Isabel Schnabel and Hyun Song Shin ( 2001). “ Foreshadowing LTCM: The Crisis of 
1763.”University of Mannheim Working Paper. 
 
Richard Sylla ( 2008) Remarks on PBS  Jim Lehrer News Hour, October 15. 
 
John B. Taylor ( 2007) “ Housing and Monetary Policy “ Federal Reserve Bank of 
























   23
 